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RECENT CASES
LnITATIONS OF AcTIoNs-CoNDmIoN PREcEDENT. The state sold shore
lands to a proprietor, contiguous to the proprietor's uplands; both parties
had assumed the lake bordered by the shore lands was a navigable body
of water. Ten years after payment to the state the proprietor brought an
action to have the lake declared non-navigable and to recover the pur-
chase price. Held: That a judicial decree that the lake was non-navigable
was a condition precedent to bringing the action and hence the Statute
of Limitations did not begin to run until such decree. Purdy v. Washing-
ton, 99 Wash. Dec. 563, 92 P. (2d) 880 (1939).
Prior to this case the rule in this state has been that the Statute of
Limitations commences to run from the time a cause of action could have
been perfected by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and that where
demand or some other prerequisite is necessary to the institution of a
cause of action, a party may not prolong the statute by failing or neglect-
ing to take the necessary steps to perfect his cause of action. Spokane
County v. Prescott, 19 Wash. 418, 53 Pac. 661, 67 Am. St. Rep. 733 (1898)
(leave of court before suing county official on his bond); Skinning v.
Pierce County, 20 Wash. 126, 54 Pac. 1006 (1898); Bennett v. Thorne, 36
Wash. 253, 78 Pac. 936 (1904) (assessment before suing on superadded
liability of bank stockholder); Brooks v. The Trustee Co., 76 Wash. 589,
136 Pac. 1152 (1913); Douglas County v. Grant County, 98 Wash. 355, 167
Pac. 928 (1917); Carstens Packing Co. v. Granger Irrigation District, 160
Wash. 674, 295 Pac. 930 (1931) (appointment of board of appraisers as
provided by contract before suing for damages); Mood v. Mood, 171 Wash.
210, 18 P. (2d) 21 (1933) (final settlement of guardian's account before
minor sues guardian); Temirecoeff v. American Express Co., 172 Wash.
409, 20 P. (2d) 23 (1933); Harris v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co.,
179 Wash. 546, 38 P. (2d) 354 (1934) (demand before suing for return of
money).
The instant case can be attacked from two points of view. First the
court found that the determination of navigability by judicial decree was a
condition precedent to suing to recover the price paid. There is no statute
so providing nor does the Commissioner of Public Lands have the authority
to determine navigability. Such matter is left entirely with the courts.
Snively v. Washington, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P. (2d) 772 (1932). It is upon
this ground that the case can be distinguished from the cases cited as
authority by the purchaser in the instant case, for in each of those cases
there was a condition to be performed before access to the courts was
allowed. United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32 (1887) (must have ap-
proval of United States Commissioner of Public Lands before bringing
action); Sweeny v. Butte, 64 Mont. 230, 208 Pac. 943 (1922) (must estab-
lish right to office in special type judicial action before bringing action);
In re Harris, 12 Misc. Rep. 223, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1102, aff'd, 90 Hun. 525, 36
N. Y. Supp. 29 (1895) (must have comptroller annul title of state before
bringing action).
Assuming the determination of non-navigability is a condition prece-
dent to plaintiff's recovery, yet, as shown above, the Washington court
does not recognize such conditions as sufficient to toll the Statute of Limi-
tations when the power to bring about fulfillment rests in the plaintiff.
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It is submitted that the rule stated should have been applied to the
instant case. It is significant to note, in weighing the court's decision,
that the briefs very inadequately discussed the prior Washington cases.
That four judges dissented is an indication of the unsatisfactory reasoning
of the decision at which the majority arrived.
I K. K.
PENSIONS--VESTED I.IGHTS-SURVVAL TO ESTATE OF PENSIONER. Action by
the administrator of a deceased blind person's estate against Grays Harbor
County to recover the amount of accrued pension owing to the deceased at
the time of his death. Held: "The benefits of the act were intended for the
personal use of the pensioner and no right to accrued pension passed to
his estate." Hart, as Administrator, v. Grays Harbor County, 197 Wash.
604, 86 P. (2d) 198 (1939).
In the absence of contract a pension is generally considered merely a
bounty or gratuity to which no rights can vest in the recipient. Whitaker
v. Clausen, 57 Wash. 268, 106 Pac. 745, 107 Pac. 832 (1910) (involving a
veteran's pension). In re Snyder's Petition, 93 Wash. 59, 160 Pac. 12 (1916),
3 A. L. R. 1233 (1919), aff'd per curiam, 248 U. S. 539 (1918) (involving a
pension for an abandoned wife).
However there is a line of authority holding that when any particular
payment has become due under a pension act, the pensioner has a vested
right to such payment. Foot v. Knowles, 45 Mass. 386 (1842); Slade v.
Slade, 65 Mass. 466 (1853); Gibbs v. Minneapolis Fire Dept. Relief Assn.,
125 Minn. 174, 145 N. W. 1075, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 749 (1914). A Washington
case coming to the same conclusion is that of Conant v. State, 197 Wash.
21, 84 P. (2d) 378 (1938). In the Conant case six judges came to the con-
clusion that under the state social security act (Wash. Laws 1935, c. 182,
p. 855, as amended by Wash. Laws 1937,, c. 156, p. 548), an applicant
who could qualify under the terms of the act providing for an old age
pension had a vested right to payments thereunder from the date of her
application, a sum in excess of $400.00, in addition to the right to future
payments as they became due.
In the Hart case the pensioner's right to the pension had been judicially
established. State ex rel. Hart v Gleeson, 189 Wash. 292, 64 P. (2d) 1023
(1937). Hence under the rule of the Conant case the pensioner had a
vested right to collect the full amount of his pension from the date of
his application. But if a vested right existed in the Hart case it would
seem that such right should have survived to the estate of the pensioner.
The Conant and Hart cases cannot be distinguished on the grounds of
intended benefits of the acts providing the pensions. The Hart case deter-
mined that the pensioner has no vested right which can pass to his estate
on his death because the intent of the act was only to provide for him
while living, but it may be fairly stated that the intent of the state social
security act also was merely to provide for the old-age pensioner while
he was living.
Thus if the theory of the Conant case is correct, then the result in the
Hart case appears to be erroneous. But if the theory of the Hart case is
correct, that the pensioner gets no vested right to pension from the date
of application, then the result in the Conant case is incorrect. It is sub-
mitted that the Hart case does not directly over-rule the Conant case, but
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in any event it appears to be a modification or weakening of the rule
in that case.
It is significant that in deciding the Hart case five members of the court
thought that the rule of the Conant case should govern. The three con-
curring judges admitted that proposition but were anxious to see the
rule of the Conant case reversed. These judges are the same ones who
dissented in the Conant case, and their position is apparently that the
pensioner should never receive a vested right to such pension as is here
under discussion. The two dissenting judges in the Hart case based their
dissent largely on the Conant case. These two were with the majority in
the Conant case, and their position seems to be that the pensioner should
always have a vested right to accrued pension. The other four judges
subscribed to the prevailing opinion in the Hart case and were with the
majority in the Conant case. The position of these four judges, a minority
of the court, has become the law of this state because of concurrence in
the decision on each occasion by some of the other five judges, all of
whom disagreed with the result reached in one or the other of the cases.
The rule seems to be, if both the Conant and Hart cases are taken into
account, that the petitioner whose application is accepted has a vested
right to all payments from the date of the application until his death, but
his "vested right" is subject to be divested on his death and no right of
action for any accrued payments passes to his estate.
J. M. D.
STATUTES OF LIVITATION-INTERPRETATION-RE:MOVAL OF BAR. Clark, a
longshoreman, received an award under Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 901 et
seq. (Supp. 1938), which provided in Section 921 that any compensation
order should become final at the expiration of thirty days, and in Section
922 that any award could be modified within one year from the date of
last payment of compensation. Libelants paid compensation pursuant to
the award which became final on September 26, 1931, there having been
no attempt to modify or set aside the award. An additional award was
made to Clark following the enactment of a private statute of April 10,
1936, 49 Stat. 2244 (1936), dispensing as to Clark the previously existing
time limit for appealing awards, and authorizing an additional award.
Libelants attacked the private act as unconstitutional. Held: "The in-
validity of the private statute is not so free from doubt as to overcome
the presumption of its validity . . ." Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall,
Deputy Com'r, 27 F. Supp. 823 (1939).
Under the prevailing view Statutes of Limitation are considered
procedural, and changes or modifications of the statutes are treated as
affecting merely remedies, not rights. Oliver et al. v. Crewdson's Adm'r
et al., 256 Ky. 797, 77 S. W. (2d) 20 (1934); Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y.
295, 28 N. E. 638 (1891); STMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) p. 141. And
under this view even though defences have been perfected by the com-
plete running of a statute, legislation which removes the bar and destroys
the defence is not unconstitutional, for rights remain unaffected and rem-
edies alone are altered. Cambell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885); W. B. Herr
v. Lewis Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 258 Pac. 1039 (1927). For minority cases
see Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1316. As an exception to the general rule it
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is well recognized that when an act which creates a new cause of action
also imposes a time limitation for instituting suit, the Statute of Limita-
tions is substantive in nature and the right of action is extinguished when
the time prescribed for maintaining suit has expired. Harrisburg v. Rich-
ards, 119 U. S. 199 (1886); La Floridienne, J. Buttgenbach Co. v. Seaboard
Air Line R. Co., 59 Fla. 196, 52 So. 298 (1910); GOODRICH, CONFLIcT OF LAWS
(2d ed. 1938) p. 203; see Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 454 (1904).
Constitutional authority is agreed that the revival of a liability barred
by a Statute of Limitations which pertains to and qualifies rights is a
deprivation of property within the purview of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution; Danzer & Co. v. Gult & Ship
Island R. R. Co., 268 U. S. 633 (1924); Peninsula Produce Exchange v. New
York P. & N. R. Co. et al., 152 Md. 594, 137 At. 350 (1927); but where
the time limitation is extended before the statute has expired, the con-
stitutional objection is not encountered, for defences do not vest until
the falling of the bar. Davis v. Mills, supra.
In the instant case the statute which created the right of action also
imposed time limitations for its enforcement. It is submitted that the
court, by adopting the reasoning of the above line of authorities, could
have found, without doing violence to the usual presumption of con-
stitutionality, that the statute was substantive in nature; and that having
expired, it conferred a vested defence, the impairment of which by the
act in question amounted to a deprivation of property.
However the foregoing rationale might be inapplicable if substance
be found in the distinction that in the cases above noted the limitation
was imposed on the time within which suit could be brought on a cause
of action created by the same act, whereas the limitation in the instant
case is directed to the right to appeal an award made under the act.
One line of authority in dealing with the latter situation holds that there
are no vested rights in any mode of procedure, and that statutes giving
and regulating the right to appeal are remedial, Sampeyraec and Stewart
v. United States, 7 Pet 222 (U. S. 1833); 2 Aim. Jura. 849, § 7; while a second
line of authority rules that rights vest under a final judgment after the
time for appeal has lapsed, and a statute extending or granting a new
right to appeal is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Germania Say. Bank, Kings County v. Village of Suspension Bridge, 159
N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33 (1899); Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66
N. E. 123 (1903); In re Handley's Estate, 15 Utah 212, 49 Pac. 829 (1897).
For collection of conflicting authority see Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1316.
M. D. L.
TAxATION-ComPENATING USE TAx-APPLIcATION TO PROPERTY NOT AvAIr-
ABLE FOR PURCHASE WITm THE STATE.. The City of Spokane brought action
to abate a 2 per cent use tax assessed by the state tax commission upon
personal property purchased outside the state and used within the state
by the plaintiff. Plaintiff contended the tax was invalid and unconsti-
tutional because a prior interpretation of the statute had held it inap-
plicable to goods purchased outside the state which were not available
for purchase within the state, thereby leaving the tax applicable only
to goods purchased outside the state which competed with similar goods
available for purchase within the state. This result was alleged to be an
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arbitrary and unreasonable classification, granting special privileges and
immunities in violation of Art. 1, § 12 of the Washington Constitution
and denying the plaintiff equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Held: The tax was
intended to apply to all goods purchased outside the state and used within
the state whether or not similar goods were available for purchase within
the state. City of Spokane v. State of Washington, 198 Wash. 682, 89
P. (2d) 826 (1939).
Although the actual effect of the portion of the compensating use tax
statute here involved (Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, § 31; Wash. Laws 1937,
c. 191, § 1) is to impose a tax burden solely upon goods purchased outside
the state and used within the state, it does not impose an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S.
577 (1937); Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14
(1935).
In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 195 Wash. 553, 81 P. (2d) 786
(1938), cert. denied, 59 S. Ct. 483 (1938), the use tax as applied to prop-
erty of the telephone company was held to be invalid on two grounds:
first, that the property involved was not available for purchase within the
state and the legislative intent was to tax only that property which com-
peted with goods sold within the state; second, that since the property
involved was equipment purchased specially for use on telegraph and
telephone lines over which a mixed interstate and intrastate business was
carried on, the tax imposed thereon was an unconstitutional burden upon
interstate commerce.
In the instant case the court expressly reversed its first basis of decision
in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, supra, so that the use tax now
applies to all goods purchased outside the state since May 1, 1935, and
used within the state, whether or not similar goods are available for
purchase within the state. The second basis of decision in Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Henneford, supra, was apparently demolished by the United
States Supreme Court in companion cases involving a California use tax
similar to the Washington tax. Cal. Laws 1935, c. 361. The Supreme Court
found no burden upon interstate commerce even though the equipment
taxed was installed for use in interstate operations immediately upon its
arrival within the state, but discovered instead "a taxable moment when
the former had reached the end of their interstate transportation and
had not yet begun to be consumed in interstate operation." Southern Pac.
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U. S. 182 (1939).
These cases, reenforced by legislation in 1939 (Wash. Laws 1939, c. 225,
§ 14), effectively restore the use tax to the full vigor of a levy upon the
use within the state of all property, not specifically exempt, which was
brought into the state subsequent to May 1, 1935. The court has, however,
refused to reopen the telephone case, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford,
99 Wash. Dec. 411, 92 P. (2d) 214 (1939); thus, the injunction decreed
therein remains intact to give the telephone company an individual ex-
emption from taxation on property subject to the statutes of 1935 and
1937. One of two 1939 statutory provisions may, however, vest the state
with a present power to assess and collect the use tax on the telephone
equipment which is, by effect of the injunction granted in the first tele-
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phone case, immune from taxation under the statutes of 1935 and 1937.
The first of these statutes (Wash. Laws 1939, c. 9, § 2), containing an ex-
press retroactive provision, was in force from February 8, 1939, to March
20, 1939; then it was repealed without a saving clause by the other statute
(Wash. Laws 1939, c. 225, § 14) which amended and reenacted the original
tax law and may itself operate retroactively to May 1, 1935.
D. G. S.
Wom~vn's COmPESATmio- Pns-msTnxG DISEASE- InJURy. A widow
claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the
death of her husband while doing his customary work in a mine. Deceased
was found to have been suffering from heart disease and hardening of
the arteries at the time of his death. There was little if any evidence of
a shock or unusual exertion as a contributing cause to the death. Held:
Compensation granted on grounds that an injury arises out of employment
when the required exertion producing the injury is too great for the man
undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition
of the man's health. Bergagna v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 99 Wash.
Dec. 232, 91 P. (2d) 551 (1939).
Workmen suffering from a disease are not precluded from recovering
for injuries sustained in the course of their employment. Note (1929)
60 A. L. R. 1299. It is well settled that where pre-existing disease is aggra-
vated by strain, unusual exertion or shock, the resultant injury is com-
pensable. Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 110.
The majority and minority opinions in the instant case represent two
different interpretations of the Washington statute defining "injury". The
Washington Act reads: "The word injury as used in this act means a
sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an im-
mediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical
condition as results therefrom." Rra. REv. STAT. §" 7675. The minority
opinion adopts a strict construction, as set out in Flynn v. Dept. of Labor
& Industries, 188 Wash. 346, 62 P. (2d) 728 (1936), where the court stated
that the statute is plain, clear, and concise, and therefore not subject to
construction, so that there must be an external act or occurrence which
causes the injury. But the Flynn case may be distinguished from the
instant case in that, in the Flynn case, the decedent's actual labor had
nothing to do with his death.
The majority opinion, interpreting the statute liberally, extends the
definition to cover cases where a workman dies from a pre-existing disease
while at his ordinary work without any unusual exertion, where such
labor contributed to his death. In support of its position, it cites the fol-
lowing cases: Metcalf v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 168 Wash. 305, 11
P. (2d) 821 (1932), where a logger died while working in an inconvenient
position and in a great hurry which caused extra strain; McKinnie v. Dept.
of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 245, 37 P. (2d) 218 (1934), in which a
docki an died after an extraordinary exertion in mooring a boat; Daugh-
erty v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 626, 63 P. (2d) 434 (1936),
in which a brakeman died while unloading logs, from what the court
termed an "untoward accident"; Devlin v. Dept. of Labor & Industries,
194 Wash. 549, 78 P. (2d) 952 (1938), in which a steam engineer died after
exerting himself more than usual. These cases all seem to involve factual
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situations in which workmen experienced unusual and extraordinary exer-
tion in pursuit of their work. The court also cites Frandila v. Dept. of
Labor & Industries, 137 Wash. 530, 243 Pac. 5 (1926), decided under an
earlier statute defining "injury" merely as "that resulting from a fortui-
tous event", with no requirement for a "tangible happening... occurring
from without". In that case, the deceased died from a heart attack while
digging a ditch, and the court held that the employment was a contributing,
proximate cause of his death even though it required only normal exer-
tion.
Although the court did not expressly so say, the decision here seems to
be based on the proposition that when injury results from the workman's
ordinary labor involving no unusual strain, the employment itself is the
outside factor required by the statute which causes a "traumatic injury"
to the workman when combined with his pre-existing disease.
The instant case is the first case in this jurisdiction, since the passage of
the 1927 act defining injury, where compensation was given for death
arising out of the ordinary work in the absence of unusual exertion.
J. S. A.
